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Introduction:	Growth	in	incarceration	rates	
In	the	last	two	decades,	there	has	been	an	extraordinary	growth	in	incarceration	rates	in	South	
America,	with	some	variations	across	national	contexts	but	generally	in	line	with	the	same	trend.	
Twenty	years	ago,	incarceration	rates	were	relatively	low	in	most	countries	in	the	region;	despite	
that	knowledge,	it	has	proved	difficult	to	reconstruct	the	official	data	for	that	period.2	In	1992,	
with	the	exclusion	of	the	small	countries	with	less	than	one	million	inhabitants	in	the	Northern	
region	of	South	America	such	as	Guyana,	French	Guyana	and	Surinam,	only	three	countries	had	
100	 prisoners	 or	more	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants:	 Uruguay	 (100),3	 Venezuela	 (133)4	 and	 Chile	
(154)	 (see	 Figure	 1).5	 Several	 other	 national	 contexts	 reflected	 ‘Scandinavian’6	 rates,	 such	 as	
Argentina	(62),	Peru	(69),7	Ecuador	(75)8	and	Brazil	(74).9	
	
Of	course,	as	has	repeatedly	been	pointed	out,	the	incarceration	rate	is	an	incomplete	indicator	
when	it	comes	to	measuring	levels	of	punitiveness,	which	is	understood	here	in	broad	terms	to	
be	 the	 levels	of	pain	or	 suffering	 caused	by	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	but	 this	measure	has	
proved	to	be	a	good	starting	point	(Sozzo	2011,	2013).	The	living	conditions	in	the	prisons	in	
Argentina	or	Peru	in	1992	were	very	different	from	those	in	Denmark	or	Finland.	Further,	the	
reasons	 for	 the	 relatively	 low	 levels	 of	 incarceration	 in	 these	 two	 regions	 at	 that	 time	were	
probably	also	very	different.	Accordingly,	our	empirical	approach	towards	punitiveness	–	both	in	
terms	of	extent	and	intensity	and	using	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	methods	–	should,	in	
general	 terms,	 be	 more	 nuanced	 (Brodeur	 2007;	 Frost	 2008;	 Hamilton	 2014;	 Hinds	 2005;	
Kommer	 2004;	 Nelken	 2005,	 2010a,	 2010b;	 Pease	 1994;	 Tonry	 2007).	 We	 simply	 use	 this	
imperfect	indicator	of	incarceration	rates	here	because	it	is	the	only	one	available	and	in	this	way	
we	can	at	least	approach	this	complex	phenomenon.10	In	any	case,	it	is	an	indicator	that	reveals	a	
relatively	 contained	 use	 of	 the	 prison	 system,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 punishment	 but	 also	 as	 a	
preventative	measure,	in	the	region	at	that	time.		
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Figure	1:	Incarceration	rates,	South	America,	199211	
	
This	outlook	has	radically	changed	 in	 just	over	two	decades.	Currently	(with	data	referring	to	
2014	and	2015),	all	South	American	countries	have	incarceration	rates	of	above	150	prisoners	
per	100,000	inhabitants,	except	for	Bolivia	(134/100,000).	There	are	four	other	countries	that	
have	 fewer	 than	 200	 prisoners	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants:	 Argentina	 (161)12	 Paraguay	 (158),	
Ecuador	(165)13	and	Venezuela	(172)14.	But	all	others	have	exceeded	that	threshold:	Peru	(236),	
Chile	(240),	Colombia	(244),	Uruguay	(282)	and	Brazil	(300)	(Figure	2).15	South	America	now	
finds	itself	far	from	the	levels	of	incarceration	in	Scandinavia,	which	have	largely	remained	at	the	
levels	of	twenty	years	ago.16	
	
Postneoliberal	political	changes	
As	 mentioned,	 the	 growth	 in	 the	 incarceration	 rate	 has	 been	 extraordinary	 in	 the	 last	 two	
decades,	despite	the	strong	variations	among	the	different	national	contexts.	The	greatest	growth	
in	incarceration	rates	has	occurred	in	Brazil	with	an	increase	of	305	per	cent	between	1992	and	
2014,	followed	by	Peru	(242	per	cent	between	1992	and	2015),	Colombia	(212	per	cent	between	
1992	 and	 2015),	 Uruguay	 (182	 per	 cent	 between	 1992	 and	 2014),	 Argentina	 (160	 per	 cent	
between	1992	and	2014)	and	Ecuador	(123	per	cent	between	1992	and	2014).	The	growth	rate	
is	shown	to	be	more	contained	due	to	elevated	starting	points	at	the	beginning	of	the	period	under	
review	in	the	case	of	Chile	(56	per	cent	between	1992	and	2015)	and	Venezuela	(29	per	cent	
between	1992	and	2014).	Bolivia	similarly	showed	a	relatively	contained	growth	rate	(72	per	
cent	between	1992	and	2014).	In	the	case	of	Paraguay	there	was	a	very	significant	growth	over	a	
shorter	period,	177	per	cent	between	1997	and	2014.	Even	though	similar	growth	trends	can	be	
observed	 in	 other	 global	 regions	 during	 this	 period	 the	degree	 to	which	 it	 occurred	 in	 South	
America	was	has	been	extraordinary.17	
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Figure	2:	Incarceration	rates,	South	America,	2014/2015	(latest	year	available)	18	
	
This	punitive	turn	in	South	America	has	been	associated	in	the	emerging	sociology	of	punishment	
literature	in	the	region	with	the	ascendance	since	the	1970s	of	neoliberalism	as	a	transnational	
political	 project	 (Iturralde	 2010,	 2012,	 2014;	 Muller	 2011).	 This	 interpretation	 is	 based	
essentially	on	the	appropriation	of	Loic	Wacquant’s	argument,	developed	to	think	about	the	case	
of	the	United	States,	but	extended	also	to	understand	the	penal	present	in	Europe	–particularly	in	
France	–	by	means	of	the	identification	of	an	import	process	of	penal	discourses	and	practices	
which	previously	has	been	generated	in	this	scenario,	that	contributed	to	the	construction	of	a	
‘neoliberal	penality’	(Wacquant	2000,	2005,	2010,	2013).	
	
This	neoliberal	political	project,	which	was	driven	across	national	borders	by	a	complex	elite	of	
dissimilar	actors,	boosted	a	triple	transformation	of	the	state:	connected	‘causal	and	functionally’,	
in	 response	 to	 the	 changes	 of	 the	 capitalist	 economy;	 the	 transition	 from	 Fordism	 to	 Post‐
Fordism;	and	the	high	levels	of	social	insecurity.	These	factors	generated	the	abolition	of	state	
intervention	in	the	economy;	the	decrease	and	change	of	logic	from	welfare	to	workfare	in	relation	
to	 their	 social	 interventions;	 and	 the	 expansion	 and	 change	 of	 logic,	 from	 rehabilitation	 to	
deterrence	and	incapacitation,	in	relation	to	their	penal	interventions.	
	
This	complex	process	is	generally	viewed	to	be	more	radical	and	extreme	in	the	context	of	South	
America	than	in	the	global	North,	because	it	progressed	from	an	already	highly	fragmented	social	
landscape	that	was	characterized	by	high	levels	of	poverty,	unemployment,	inequality	and	street	
crime,	 especially	 violent	 crime	 (Iturralde	 2010,	 2012).	 This	 focus	 can	 also	 be	 observed	 in	 an	
article	written	by	the	same	Wacquant	about	Brazil	in	2003,	in	which	he	diagnosed	the	emergence	
of	 a	 ‘dictatorship	 over	 the	 poor’	 through	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 Penal	 State	 in	 that	 context	
(Wacquant	 2003:	 198;	 see	 also	 Muller	 2011;	 Wacquant	 2008).	 In	 general,	 the	 weight	 and	
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dynamics	of	the	imported	‘Made	in	the	USA’	discourses	and	practices	are	recognised	for	the	South	
American	scenarios	within	this	interpretation	(Muller	2011:	5),	not	only	from	the	‘zero	tolerance’	
policing	 model	 to	 the	 accusatory	 model	 in	 criminal	 proceedings,	 but	 	 also	 the	 presence	 of	
endogenous	processes	that	are	inscribed	in	peculiar	historical	trajectories	(Iturralde	2012).		
	
We	 will	 not	 discuss	 the	 plausibility	 of	 this	 ambitious	 explanation	 to	 understand	 the	 global	
landscape	 of	 legal	 punishment	 at	 present	 (for	 a	 critical	 look,	 see	 Lacey	 2013;	 Nelken	 2010a,	
2010b;	Newburn	2010;	O’Malley	2012;	Valverde	2010).	But	as	the	contributions	to	this	special	
issue	illustrate,	their	findings	in	general	pose	a	challenge	regarding	the	possibility	of	applying	the	
neoliberal	 penality	 thesis	 to	 certain	 South	 American	 contexts	 that	 in	 recent	 years	 have	
experienced	strong	processes	of	political	change.	The	punitive	turn	is	not	a	uniform	project	that	
rolled	out	across	the	globe	from	North	America.	Rather	the	translation	of	global	trends	in	penality	
in	the	global	South	produced	different	outcomes	at	differing	times	and	national	contexts,	with	
varying	degrees	of	force	and	effect.	To	understand	them	we	need	to	consider	its	connections	with	
local	past	and	present	economic,	cultural,	social	and	political	processes	(Carrington,	Hogg	and	
Sozzo	2016).	
	
As	 is	 known,	 in	 recent	 years,	 processes	 of	 decisive	 political	 change	 have	 emerged	 in	 various	
national	contexts	in	South	America,	which	are	tied	to	the	rise	of	alliances	and	political	programs	
that	 are	 constructed	 around	 vocabularies	 more	 or	 less	 loosely	 associated	 with	 local	 leftist	
traditions.	 These	 vocabularies	 possess	 different	 levels	 of	 radicalism.	 There	 are	 important	
differences	between	them,	as	each	has	its	own	peculiarities,	to	some	extent	associated	with	the	
previous	political	context.	But,	in	all	cases,	the	identity	of	these	alliances	and	political	programs	
are	 constructed	 around	 a	 strong	 antagonism	 toward	 the	 foregoing	 dissemination	 of	
‘neoliberalism’	 in	 the	 region.	 In	 a	 minimal	 and	 restricted	 sense,	 these	 political	 changes	 thus	
opened	 a	 new	 ‘post‐neoliberal’	 period.	 Of	 course,	 the	 degree	 to	which	 these	 breaks	with	 the	
previous	 neoliberal	 period	 is	 translated	 into	 practice	 depends	 dramatically	 on	 the	 different	
experiences.	 This	 opens	 a	whole	 set	 of	 discussions	 in	 contemporary	 social	 science	 about	 the	
region,	both	in	general	and	with	regard	to	various	particular	issues.	In	this	regard,	this	special	
issue	and	the	collective	inquiry	of	which	it	forms	part	–	within	the	framework	of	Working	Group	
39	of	the	CLACSO:	‘Post‐neoliberalism	and	crime	control	policies	in	South	America’	–	is	intended	
as	an	initial	response	to	this	debate	specifically	in	relation	to	the	sociology	of	punishment.	
	
The	processes	of	political	change	that	are	frequently	recognised	as	the	more	radical	within	the	
context	of	this	post‐neoliberal	turn	are	those	that	occurred	in	Venezuela,	Bolivia	and	Ecuador.	In	
the	 first	 case,	 it	began	 in	February	1999	when	Hugo	Chávez	assumed	 the	presidency;	he	was	
successively	 re‐elected	 in	 2000,	 2006	 and	 2012.	 After	 his	 death	 in	 March	 2013	 the	 process	
continued	 until	 the	 presidency	 of	 Nicolás	Maduro,	 who	was	 elected	 that	 year.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
Bolivia,	 the	 political	 change	 began	 in	 January	 2006	 with	 the	 inauguration	 of	 president	 Evo	
Morales	who	was	re‐elected	successively	in	2010	and	2014.	In	Ecuador,	the	third	case,	it	began	in	
March	2007	with	the	inauguration	of	President	Rafael	Correa,	who	was	re‐elected	in	2009	and	
2013.	The	 shared	appeal	 to	 these	 three	nations	of	 a	new	version	of	 socialism	as	part	of	 their	
rhetoric	 and	 political	 practice	 is	 probably	 one	 reason	 for	 the	 frequent	 recognition	 of	 its	
radicalism.	 Additionally,	 a	 large	 rupture	 with	 long‐term	 political	 patterns	 –	 with	 their	
peculiarities	 –	 has	 been	 embodied	 within	 each	 national	 context.	 This	 has	 produced	 a	 strong	
democratizing	effect	through	the	activation	of	social	mobilization	and	participation,	particularly	
amongst	 disadvantaged	 sectors,	 which	 has	 profoundly	 transformed	 state	 structures.	 It	 is,	
therefore,	not	mere	chance	that	they	have	untangled	constituent	processes	that	have	resulted	in	
new	constitutions,	which	in	turn	has	led	to	strong	changes	with	regard	to	the	legal	traditions	of	
each	of	these	three	countries.	Strong	state	intervention	in	the	economy,	the	re‐nationalization	of	
various	 productive	 activities	 and	 public	 services,	 the	 foreign	 policy	 relations	 with	 the	 global	
North	 and	 the	 expansion	 of	 social	 policies	 are	 some	 of	 the	 innovations	 that	were	 introduced	
within	this	context	of	political	change	that	gave	substance	to	a	post‐neoliberal	identity.	
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Whether	the	same	can	be	said	of	other	political	experiences	that	developed	in	the	region	at	the	
start	of	the	2000’s	is	more	heavily	debated.	I	am	referring	to	the	processes	in	Brazil,	Argentina	
and	Uruguay.	In	the	first	case,	change	was	initiated	in	January	2003	with	the	presidency	by	Luiz	
Inácio	Lula	da	Silva,	who	was	re‐elected	 in	2007.	This	political	experience	continued	with	 the	
election	 of	 President	 Dilma	 Rousseff	 in	 2011	 who	 was	 re‐elected	 in	 2014.	 In	 Argentina,	 the	
process	began	with	the	election	of	Néstor	Kirchner	as	President	in	May	2003,	replaced	by	his	wife	
Cristina	Fernández	de	Kirchner	who	was	elected	as	President	in	the	2007	and	2011	elections.	
Finally,	in	Uruguay	the	process	started	in	March	2005	with	the	presidency	by	Tabaré	Vazquez,	
who	from	2010	onward	was	replaced	by	president	Mujica	until	the	election	of	Tabaré	Vazquez	in	
2014.	Within	these	three	national	contexts	more	symptoms	of	transactions	with	the	recent	and	
distant	past	and	a	stronger	degree	of	moderation	in	the	proposals	and	changes	in	various	fields	
can	be	observed.	In	some	of	these	cases	this	translated	in	the	gestation	of	government	alliances	
themselves,	 including	sectors	and	parties	 that	were	distant	 from	any	 type	of	 linkage	with	 the	
progressive	tradition.	This	perhaps	reached	the	highest	level	in	Brazil,	especially	in	the	last	years	
of	this	political	experience.	
	
However,	 this	has	not	prevented	the	deployment	of	various	 initiatives	that	claim	to	embody	a	
post‐neoliberal	identity,	that	were	positioned	at	the	centre	of	the	political	and	public	agenda	and	
on	which	a	large	part	of	the	accession	of	voters	and	supporters	of	these	political	experiences	was	
built.	For	example,	 in	the	case	of	Argentina,	 ‘Kirchnernism’	–	a	complex	governmental	alliance	
that	embodies	a	post‐neoliberal	face	of	the	long	Peronist	tradition	–	installed	various	initiatives	
that	were	constructed	 to	antagonise	 the	ways	of	neoliberal	and	neoconservative	 thinking	and	
acting	which	in	the	recent	past	had	been	dominant	in	this	national	context.	These	included:	the	
cancellation	of	the	external	debt	with	the	World	Bank	and	the	International	Monetary	Fund	and	
the	rejection	of	its	role	in	dictating	and	controlling	decision	making	in	local	economic	policy;	the	
alignment	with	progressive	 governments	 in	 rejecting	 the	United	States’	 proposal	 for	 the	Free	
Trade	Area	of	the	Americas	(FTAA);	Neo‐Keynesian	policies	that	rebuilt	various	mechanisms	of	
state	intervention	in	economic	life;	the	expansion	of	social	policies,	particularly	the	development	
of	 the	 Universal	 Allowance	 per	 Child;	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 collective	 negotiation	 between	
employers	and	unions;	the	nationalization	of	productive	and	public	services	companies	that	had	
been	privatized	during	the	wave	of	neoliberal	reforms;	and	so	on.	
	
In	any	case,	 it	 seems	that	 it	 is	very	difficult	 to	 think	about	 these	political	processes	as	a	mere	
continuity	of	the	neoliberal	period	in	the	region.	Nevertheless,	the	way	that	the	punitive	turn	in	
South	 America	 is	 understood	 in	 sociological	 literature	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	
neoliberal	transnational	political	project	overlook	this	evident	difficulty.	Iturralde	(2010:	311‐
312)	recognized	the	potential	impact	of	these	political	changes	in	the	penal	field	as	something	
relevant	 that	 specifically	 needs	 to	 be	 studied,	 but	 later	 points	 out,	 anticipating	 a	 general	
conclusion:		
	
Even	though	the	new	leftist	governments	of	the	region	have	tried	to	secede	from	
the	penal	discourses	and	policies	of	their	right‐wing	predecessors,	their	effectively	
adopted	 policies	 and	 approaches	 are	 very	 similar	 to	 those	 of	 their	 political	
opponents.	This	may,	 in	part,	 have	 resulted	 from	a	 lack	of	 original	 and	 reliable	
ideas	that	emerged	in	these	governments,	but	also	from	the	fear	of	weakening	their	
political	position	if	they	appear	too	soft	with	respect	to	crime	and	because	of	the	
fear	to	confront	the	state	security	forces	that	are	very	powerful	and	many	of	whose	
members	 are	 still	 very	 attached	 to	 the	methods	 and	 ideas	 of	 the	 authoritarian	
regimes.	(Iturralde	2010:	323)	
	
It	is	precisely	the	invitation	that	is	contained	within	this	remark	that	this	special	issue	–		and	the	
collective	inquiry	in	which	it	is	inscribed	–	aims	to	capture	and	unfold,	including	a	review	of	this	
general	conclusion.	In	all	these	six	countries,	the	incarceration	rate	has	grown	during	the	different	
periods	in	which	these	post‐neoliberal	political	alliances	ruled,	though	not	to	the	same	degree	
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and	starting	from	different	preceding	levels	(Figure	3).	In	Venezuela,	between	1998,	the	last	year	
before	starting	the	process	of	political	change,	and	2014	–	a	period	of	16	years	–	the	incarceration	
rate	grew	by	65	per	cent.	In	Brazil,	between	2002	and	2014	–	in	12	years,	a	shorter	period	than	
in	the	case	of	Venezuela	–		the	incarceration	rate	increased	by	119	per	cent.	In	Argentina,	between	
2002	and	2014	–	a	similar	period	to	that	of	Brazil	–	the	incarceration	rate	increased	by	32	per	
cent.	In	Uruguay,	between	2004	and	2014	–	in	one	decade	–	the	incarceration	rate	increased	by	
35	per	cent.	In	Bolivia,	between	2005	and	2014	–	nine	years	–	the	incarceration	rate	increased	by	
81	per	cent.	And	in	Ecuador,	between	2006	and	2014	–	in	eight	years	–	the	incarceration	rate	
increased	by	59	per	cent.	
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75% - 99%
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Figure	3:	Growth	rate	of	the	incarceration	rate	in	countries	that	have	experienced	political	change,	
South	America	
	
In	all	these	countries,	these	processes	of	political	change	lasted	over	a	decade.	In	any	case,	they	
have	 far	exceeded	the	potential	characterization	as	circumstantial	mutations.	That	 is	why	this	
special	 issue	 aims	 to	 make	 an	 original	 contribution	 to	 the	 discussion	 about	 the	 evolution	 of	
penality	 within	 the	 context	 of	 these	 political	 change	 processes,	 recognizing	 its	 entity	 and	
relevance.	It	addresses	four	of	these	six	national	cases	(Venezuela,	Ecuador,	Brazil	and	Argentina),	
and	we	hope	that	this	work	boosts	similar	analyses	on	the	other	two	(Bolivia	and	Uruguay).	To	
this	end,	authors	of	each	piece	have	worked	on	developing	an	in‐depth	analysis	of	each	national	
case	study,	from	a	common	minimum	research	design,	which	involves	a	crucial	element	such	as	
the	incarceration	rate	but	that	multiplies	the	possible	openings	to	the	dynamics	of	the	penal	field	
in	 each	 scenario,	 based	 on	 the	 strong	 recognition	 of	 its	 embeddedness	 and	 peculiarities.	We	
believe	that	this	initial	contribution	may	later	be	reinforced	by	further	explorations.	Spreading	it	
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in	the	English‐speaking	world,	through	this	special	issue,	is	a	very	significant	task	to	amplify	and	
enrich	the	debate.	
	
Politics	and	penalty	
In	 recent	 years,	 certain	 narratives	 have	 emerged	 in	 the	 sociology	 of	 punishment	 that,	 from	
different	 perspectives,	 have	 emphasized	 the	 dependence	 of	 the	 penal	 policy	 transformations,	
including	the	levels	of	punitiveness,	on	the	structural	changes	of	social	life	which,	in	turn,	tend	to	
be	 ascribed	 the	 status	 of	 epochal	 and	 even	 global	 change,	 with	 smaller	 or	 larger	 degrees	 of	
caution.	Perhaps	the	most	well‐known	example	has	been	the	work	of	David	Garland	(2001;	also	
see	 1996,	 2004).	 But	 there	 certainly	 have	 been	 other	 significant	 efforts,	 such	 as	 the	work	 of	
Wacquant	which	I	have	made	reference	to	here.	However,	these	connections	are	often	postulated	
in	a	way	that	fails	to	fully	address	‘how’	these	different	structural	transformations	are	effectively	
connected	with	the	decisions	and	actions	that	occur	in	the	penal	field	(Goodman,	Page	and	Phelps	
2014;	Matthews	2005;	Nelken	2010b;	O’Malley	2004a).		
	
Recently,	 Garland	 himself	 has	 acknowledged	 this	 to	 some	 extent,	 posing	 that	 some	 of	 the	
narratives	 that	attempt	 to	explain	penal	changes,	 including	his	own,	have	 failed	to	adequately	
address	the	‘specific	processes	that	“translate”	social	causes	into	criminal	effects,	examining	how	
these	 transmission	 processes	 operates	 in	 different	 jurisdictions’.	Within	 this	 context,	 Garland	
(2013:	483‐484)	calls	for	a	move	from	the	‘background	causes’	to	‘proximate	causes’	which	are	
‘causally	determinative’.	Beyond	this	‘causal’	language,	this	appeal	is	substantially	similar	to	the	
one	 we	 posed	 when	 referring	 to	 the	 ‘how’	 of	 the	 connections	 presented	 in	 the	 explanatory	
frameworks.	From	my	point	of	view,	‘politics’	plays	a	central	role	in	the	structuring	of	this	‘how’.	
This	because	it	is	the	translation	space,	par	excellence,	of	what	happens	in	social,	economic	and	
cultural	relations,	in	the	field	of	penality	(Garland	2004;	O’Malley	2004a;	Savelsberg	1999).	
	
Much	recent	sociological	and	criminological	literature	has	argued	for	the	need	to	generate	a	more	
detailed	exploration	of	the	relationship	between	politics	and	penality	to	understand	the	changes	
that	 have	 occurred	 in	 recent	 decades.	 But	 these	 appeals	 clearly	 depart	 from	 distinct	ways	 of	
conceiving	politics.	There	have	been	a	number	of	recent	invocations	about	the	need	to	consider	
certain	institutional	dimensions	of	it	–	or	what	is	often	referred	to	as	the	‘state’	–	to	understand	
penal	 change,	 especially	 within	 challenging	 comparative	 views.	 For	 example,	 consider	 the	
interesting	work	pioneered	by	Joachin	Savelsberg	(1994,	1999,	2002,	2004),	which	departs	from	
a	comparison	between	the	United	States	and	Germany,	focusing	on	the	importance	of	institutional	
mechanisms	of	production	and	dissemination	of	knowledge	and	beliefs	and	 legal	and	political	
decision	making.	Or	think	about	the	recent	explorations	by	Nicola	Lacey	(2008,	2010a,	2010b,	
2011a,	2011b,	2013)	 that	 look	at	 the	relationship	between	various	 types	of	capitalist	political	
economies	and	different	penal	policies,	constructing	a	model	of	‘interlinked	variables’	in	which	
‘institutional	dimensions’	are	emphasized	and	are	related	to	the	characteristics	of	the	political	
systems	(electoral	models,	types	of	professional	bureaucracies)	or	the	constitutional	structures	
(distribution	of	decision‐making	powers	or	the	selection	and	tenure	of	judges	and	prosecutors).	
These	works	can	be	useful,	but	remain	in	the	field	of	defining	‘factors’	that	could,	in	a	probabilistic	
sense,	produce	penal	outcomes,	even	though	they	don’t	always	do	it,	as	evidenced	by	some	of	the	
works	of	the	same	authors	when	they	‘descend’	on	the	detailed	exploration	of	certain	national	
cases,	 such	 as	with	New	Zealand	as	 analysed	by	Lacey	 (2010a,	 2010b,	2011a,	 2011b).	 In	 this	
sense,	they	provide	a	good	point	of	departure	but	never	an	arrival	point	for	the	unfolding	of	the	
description	 and	 interpretation.	 They	 leave,	 to	 some	extent,	 a	 ‘black	box’,	 because	 they	do	not	
account	for	‘the	empirical	processes	and	actors’	choices’	(Garland	2013:	492).	
	
This	special	issue	seeks	to	be	a	contribution	in	encouraging	the	development	of	studies	about	the	
relationship	between	politics	 and	penality	 but	 not	 in	 terms	of	 trying	 to	 sustain	 the	weight	 of	
certain	institutional	dimensions	thereof	as	conditions	that	make	certain	penal	changes	possible.	
In	the	studies	that	do	integrate	it,	the	emphasis	is	put	on	the	exploration	of	the	results	–	always	
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relatively	contingent	and	contestable	–	of	the	constant	material	and	symbolic	struggles	between	
the	actors	 that	 in	 certain	 times	and	places	have	distinctive	 types	and	amounts	of	 force	 in	 the	
political	 field.	 This	 especially	 applies	 to	 how	 certain	 alliances	 and	 governmental	 programs	
approach	penality	and	what	continuity	or	discontinuity	they	introduce	with	regard	to	their	recent	
and	distant	past,	within	the	context	of	some	particular	change	processes	that	have	some	common	
elements	across	distinct	national	scenarios.	This	does	not	mean	that	these	are	the	only	actors	who	
play	a	relevant	role	in	these	conflicts	about	the	power	to	punish,	which	determine	how	much	and	
how	pain	should	be	intentionally	inflicted	on	whom,	and	why	(Christie	1982).	As	has	been	already	
pointed	out,	 the	very	agents	of	the	penal	 field	–	 judges,	prosecutors,	police,	prison	guards	and	
directors,	and	so	on	–	play	a	central	role,	with	their	ways	of	thinking	and	acting	to	a	large	degree	
moulding	the	penal	results	(Cavadino	and	Dignam	2006,	2011;	Goodman,	Page	and	Phelps	2014;	
Nelken	2010a,	2010b).	These	actors	and	their	strategies	appear	with	varying	degrees	of	intensity	
in	the	different	studies	included	in	this	special	issue,	but	there	is	no	doubt	that	there	is	need	for	a	
wider	range	of	explorations	about	this	dimension	of	the	very	same	national	cases	to	be	further	
developed	in	the	future.	
	
This	special	issue	seeks	to	emphasize	the	crucial	place	of	the	political	struggles,	in	a	broad	sense,	
that	 are	 often	 lost	 in	 the	 contemporary	 debate,	 in	 the	description	 and	explanation	of	 a	 ‘great	
transformation’	which	appears	not	 to	depend	on	the	choices	and	actions	of	any	agent	(Brown	
2005;	O	‘Malley	2004a,	2000;	Goodman	Page	and	Phelps	2012).	In	this	direction,	we	follow	here	
the	 propositions	 that	 recently	 have	 been	 made	 by	 numerous	 contemporary	 authors	 in	 the	
sociology	of	punishment	(Beckett	1997;	Beckett	and	Sasson	2001;	Cavadino	and	Dignam	2011;	
Feeley	2003;	Goodman,	Page	and	Phelps	2014;	Gottschalk	2006;	O’Malley	1999;	Sasson	2000;	
Scheingold	1991;	Simon	2007;	Simon	and	Feeley	2003;	Sparks	2003a,	2003b;	Pavarini	2006).	Of	
course	there	exists	the	danger	of	falling	in	a	‘voluntarist’	extreme.	As	David	Garland	warns:	
	
But	it	is	possible	to	overestimate	the	scope	for	political	action	and	overstate	the	
degree	 of	 choice	 that	 is	 realistically	 available	 to	 the	 governmental	 or	 non‐
governmental	 actors	 ...	 such	 choices	 are	 always	 conditioned	 by	 institutional	
structures,	social	forces	and	cultural	values.	(Garland	2004:	181)19	
	
Beyond	 acknowledging	 its	 limitations	 and	 constraints,	 which	 always	 condition	 but	 never	
determine	 (Goodman,	 Page	 and	 Phelps	 2014:	 5)	 a	 more	 ‘substantively	 political’	 approach	
(O’Malley	 1999;	 Sparks	 2001)	 of	 the	 penal	 changes	 implies,	 insisting	 on	 ‘a	method	 that	 sees	
political	 combat	 as	 pivotal	 in	 determining	 the	 character	 of	 crime	 control	 ...	 rather	 than	
epiphenomenal	to	the	master	patterns	of	structural	change’	(Sparks	and	Loader	2004:	16).	The	
detailed	delineation	of	the	force	of	the	political	struggles	cannot	be	carried	out	in	a	general	and	
abstract	manner.	 It	has	 to	be,	 in	any	case,	 something	explored	 in	 its	embeddedness	 in	certain	
historical	and	cultural	contexts	(Melossi	2001;	Melossi,	Sparks	and	Sozzo,	2011;	Nelken	2011).20	
It	is	also,	undoubtedly,	a	condition	for	resistance	and	contestation	(Brown	2005;	O	‘Malley	2000;	
Sparks	and	Loader	2004).		
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1	This	article	was	originally	published	in	Spanish	(available	at	
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/gt/20160404115404/Postneoliberalismo_penalidad.pdf)	and	was	translated	
for	this	special	issue.	
2	Where	possible,	we	have	used	the	official	data	that	the	several	governmental	authorities	report	to	the	International	
Center	for	Prison	Studies	for	the	development	of	the	World	Prison	Brief.	However,	it	is	necessary	to	mention	that	in	
some	cases	these	data	did	not	coincide	with	the	data	that	the	same	governmental	authorities	provided	in	different	
instances	for	the	same	time	period	and	that	were	found	in	other	works.	We	will	make	specific	notes	of	these	occasions	
in	the	footnotes.	It	especially	occurred	frequently	for	the	1990s.	When	this	source	was	not	available	we	turned	to	
others	that	were	available,	both	on	a	regional	and	a	national	level	which	will	specifically	be	indicated.		
3	For	this	year	other	sources	referred	to	a	rate	of	96	prisoners	per	100,000	inhabitants	(Carranza	2012;	Dammert	and	
Zuñiga	2008).	
4	 We	 here	 used	 the	 data	 from	 the	 official	 source	 –	 National	 Directorate	 for	 Penitentiary	 Services	 –	 reported	 by	
Hernández	and	Grijales	in	the	respective	article	of	this	current	special	issue.	
5	Other	sources,	which	quote	from	official	information,	refer	to	a	rate	of	148	prisoners	per	100,000	inhabitants	for	this	
year	(Dammert	and	Zuñiga	2008).	
6	In	this	year,	the	incarceration	rate,	according	to	the	Institute	for	Criminal	Policy	Research	(ICPS),	was	58/100,000	in	
Norway,	60/100,000	in	Sweden,	70/100,000	in	Finland	and	70/100,000	in	Denmark.	
7	Other	sources,	that	quote	official	 information,	refer	to	a	rate	of	77	prisoners	per	100,000	inhabitants	for	this	year	
(Carranza	2012;	Dammert	and	Zuñiga	2008).	
8Here	we	 have	 used	 the	 official	 data	 of	 the	National	 Social	 Rehabilitation	 Service	 as	 reported	 by	 Paladines	 in	 the	
respective	article	of	this	special	issue.	
9	Here	we	have	used	the	official	data	as	reported	by	Carranza	(2012)	and	Dammert	and	Zuñiga	(2008).	
10At	the	same	time,	we	must	recognize	the	difficulties	that	the	comparisons	around	this	indicator	have	in	the	region.	In	
the	 first	place,	 the	 state	 agencies	 that	 generate	 the	 information	are	often	 also	 those	 that	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	
governance	of	penal	institutions	and	there	is	not	usually	a	reliability	monitoring	mechanism	in	place.	Secondly,	the	
criteria	 to	 define	 the	 prison	 population	 and	 therefore	 calculate	 the	 incarceration	 rate	 are	 not	 identical	 in	 each	
country.	In	some	cases,	people	who	are	enjoying	prison	benefits	such	as	temporary	releases,	daytime	imprisonment	
or	night‐time	imprisonment	are	included	but	not	in	others.	Additionally,	in	some	countries	in	the	region	there	are	
many	people	that	are	deprived	of	their	freedom	in	institutional	settings	that	are	not	managed	by	correctional	agencies	
but	rather	by	the	police	forces	–	even	when	they	are	processed	or	convicted	–	such	as	in	Brazil	or	Argentina.	In	some	
cases,	these	numbers	are	included	in	the	official	calculation	of	the	incarceration	rate	but	not	in	other	cases.	(Dammert	
et	al.	2010).	
11The	data	available	from	French	Guyana	are	from	1998	(ICPS).	The	data	for	Paraguay	are	from	1997	(ICPS).	For	the	
same	years	some	other	works	report	a	rate	of	70	prisoners	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	this	country,	also	citing	official	
sources	 (Carranza	 2012;	 Dammert	 and	 Zuñiga	 2008).	 For	 1992	 other	 sources	 report	 different	 official	 data	 for	
Colombia:	 92	 prisoners	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants	 (Carranza	 2012)	 and	 74	 prisoners	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants	
(Dammert	and	Zuñiga	2008).	
12In	this	case,	we	included	the	official	rate	of	2014	as	produced	by	the	Ministry	of	 Justice	and	Human	Rights	of	the	
Nation	for	this	year	as	reported	by	Sozzo	in	the	respective	article	of	this	special	issue.	
13In	this	case	we	 included	the	rate	 from	the	official	data	of	2014	as	produced	by	the	National	Directorate	of	Social	
Rehabilitation	as	reported	by	Paladines	in	the	respective	article	of	this	special	issue.	
14In	this	case,	we	included	the	rate	from	the	official	data	of	2014	as	produced	by	the	National	Directorate	of	Penitentiary	
Services	as	reported	by	Grajales	and	Hernández	in	the	respective	article	of	this	special	issue.	
15In	this	case	we	included	the	rate	from	official	data	of	2014	as	produced	by	the	National	Penitentiary	Department	as	
reported	by	de	Azevedo	and	Cifali	reported	in	the	respective	article	of	this	special	issue.	
16Namely:	Finland	(55	for	2014),	Sweden	(57	for	2014),	Denmark	(67	for	2014)	and	Norway	(75	for	2014).	
17A	 similar	 trend	 can	 be	 observed	 in	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 English‐speaking	 countries.	 According	 to	 the	 ICPS,	 the	
incarceration	rate	between	1992	and	2014	increased	by	65.5	per	cent	 in	England	and	Wales,	60	per	cent	 in	New	
Zealand	and	62	per	 cent	 in	Australia.	The	 rate	 increased	by	41	per	 cent	 in	 the	United	States,	while	 in	Canada	 it	
decreased	by	6	per	cent	between	1991	and	2013.	However,	in	all	these	countries	the	growth	rate	is	lower	than	in	any	
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of	 the	 South	 American	 countries,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 Venezuela	 and	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Chile	 similar	 rates	 can	 be	
observed.	
18The	source	of	these	data	is	the	ICPS,	with	the	exception	of	the	aforementioned	cases	of	Argentina,	Brazil,	Ecuador	and	
Venezuela.	The	data	from	Chile,	Colombia,	Peru	and	French	Guyana	refers	to	2015.	For	the	following	countries	the	
data	refer	to	2014:	Bolivia,	Ecuador,	Paraguay,	Uruguay,	Brazil,	Venezuela,	Suriname,	Guyana	and	Argentina.		
19Or,	as	Jock	Young	(2004:	554)	posed	in	a	more	general	and	classic	way,	recalling	the	words	of	Marx	in	The	Eighteenth	
Brumaire	of	Louis	Bonaparte:	‘We	exist,	as	it	is	said,	in	a	world	not	of	our	making,	we	make	our	history	not	just	as	we	
please	but	under	circumstances	not	chosen	by	ourselves,	but	encountered	and	transmitted	from	the	past’.		
20Faced	with	 a	 style	 of	 contemporary	 literature	 that	 does	 not	 give	 importance	 to	 ‘place’	 in	 their	 descriptions	 and	
explanations	of	what	is	occurring	in	the	penal	field,	this	implies	a	commitment	to	the	development	of	‘more	detailed	
and	specific,	empirically	based’	explorations	of	the	‘	transformations	and	continuities’	‘in	the	particular	jurisdictions	
in	recent	decades’’	(Brown	2005:	28;	see	in	the	same	direction,	Newburn	and	Jones	2005;	Newburn	and	Sparks	2004;	
O’Malley	2004b;	Sparks	2001;	Sparks	and	Loader	2004).		
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